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Abstract 
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) technology is still under development and appropriate legislative safeguards must 
be established to regulate the placing on the market of such vehicles and ensuring proper road-users safety. 
Given the pace of technological development in that field, a very fast response is needed to ensure that 
automated vehicles are safe and that this safety is properly assessed/demonstrated by manufacturers or/and 
public authorities.  
Many different approaches for assessing the safety of AVs are being considered in the European Union and 
worldwide by governments, industry and other stakeholders. The present report summarises the outcomes of 
a literature review and analysis of different approaches considered for AVs safety assessment that were 
discussed during the 1st Technical Workshop on New Approaches for Automated Vehicle Certification, co-
chaired by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate-General for Internal 
Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) on November 22nd 2018 in Brussels. The workshop 
gathered together a group of experts on AV active safety verification, to discuss the state of play in the field, 
which are the different merits/limits of the different methodologies and the way forward. 
Preliminary analysis and considerations suggested the complementarity of the considered approaches, both in 
terms of readiness and perspective. Further research and stakeholders’ collaboration will be needed to 
elaborate on a possible harmonised approach. 
 3 
1 Introduction 
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) technology is evolving with an unprecedented fast pace and suitable type approval 
legislation updates are needed to ensure safe vehicles on-road prior to market deployment. The increasing 
complexity of AV systems, necessary to allow the vehicle performing driving tasks autonomously, demands 
for deeper understanding of safety-critical aspects. In addition, further research on innovative safety 
assessment methods is required, since verification through physical testing alone will not be enough to face 
the huge variety of driving tasks and scenarios to be assessed. 
As announced in the Communication on connected and automated mobility adopted on 17 May 2018 
(European Commission, 2018), the European Commission would work with Member States in 2018 on 
guidelines to ensure a harmonised approach for national ad-hoc vehicle safety assessments of automated 
vehicles. Moreover, it would initiate work with Member States and stakeholders on a new approach for vehicle 
safety certification for automated vehicles. 
The work has already started on the Guidelines for the type approval of automated vehicles (SAE levels 3 and 
4) under a European Union (EU) exemption procedure1 with a proposal from European Commission services 
made on 18 October 2018, which was opened for public comments until 16 November 2018. The guidelines 
were adopted by Member States on 12 February 2019 (European Commission, 2019).  
At the same time, the Europe on the move Communication proposed a revision of the Vehicle General Safety 
Regulation (European Union, 2018), empowering the Commission to lay out technical requirements and 
specific test criteria for the type-approval of automated vehicles for what concerns safety requirements. On 
25 March 2019, the European Parliament, Council and Commission reached a provisional political agreement 
on the revised General Safety Regulation. As a result, new safety technologies will become mandatory in 
European vehicles by 2022. 
Due to the intrinsic characteristics of such new technologies (enabling the vehicle to take over driver's tasks), 
defining unique and unambiguous type approval procedure for ensuring AVs safety is not a trivial task, and it 
will not be possible to only consider some simple physical testing as in the traditional way. At the moment, 
many different approaches for assessing the safety of AVs are being considered in the EU and worldwide by 
governments, industry and other stakeholders. Therefore, there is the need for evaluating alternative and 
complementary methodologies to ensure that these vehicles are safe and provide ways to assess vehicle 
safety. This work will be relevant in the short term for assessments carried out under the EU exemption 
procedure as well as for the future EU legal vehicles safety framework. Moreover, it is intended to support the 
discussion that needs to take place at international level in the framework of the United Nations and with our 
main international partners (e.g. China, Japan, Korea, Russia, USA). 
The present report summarises the outcomes of a literature review and analysis of different approaches 
considered for AVs safety assessment that were discussed during the 1st Technical Workshop on New 
Approaches for Automated Vehicle Certification, co-chaired by the JRC and DG GROW on November 22nd 2018 
in Brussels. The workshop gathered a group of experts on AV active safety verification, to discuss the state of 
play in the field, which are the different merits/limits of the different methodologies and the way forward. The 
contents of the present report were shared in the form of a concept paper prior to the meeting. The workshop 
agenda is attached in the Annex. 
 
                                           
1Technologies not foreseen by current vehicle rules, such as automated driving systems may be approved under a special 
exemption procedure in accordance with Article 20 of Directive 2007/46/EC on the approval of motor vehicles.  
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2 Methodologies 
2.1 Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) 
The Mobileye approach (Mobileye, 2018) for AVs safety foresees the application of a predetermined set of 
rules to ensure safe operation and unequivocally evaluate and determine responsibility when AVs are involved 
in collisions with human-driven cars. The proposed solution sets clear rules for fault in advance, based on a 
mathematical model: when the rules are predetermined, then the responsibility can be defined conclusively 
based on facts. Accidents with automated vehicles could still happen (e.g. because of other road users), but 
the set of rules would at least guarantee that this accident is not caused by the automated vehicle. 
Mobileye designed the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) to ensure that the automated system would not 
issue a command that would lead to the AV causing an accident. According to Mobileye, such approach would 
allow avoiding the data-intensive validation process on-road or in a simulated environment: AV safety is 
simply validated by proving that the system evaluates all commands against the predetermined set of 
mathematical rules.  
According to Mobileye, RSS system can validate three orders of magnitude improvement to one traffic fatality 
for every one billion hours of driving vs. the human-driven vehicle rate of one traffic fatality for every one 
million hours of driving (i.e. a US traffic fatality rate of approximately 40 per year compared to approximately 
40,000 in 2016).  
As specified by Mobileye, the AV shall operate based on the following definitions:  
— Safe State, when there is no risk that the AV will cause an accident despite possible unsafe actions from 
other vehicles 
— Default Emergency Policy, that defines the boundaries for most aggressive evasive action that an AV can 
take to maintain or regain a Safe State 
— Cautious Command, representing the complete set of commands that maintains a Safe State 
RSS base principle is that the AV is never allowed to make a command outside the set of Cautious 
Commands, ensuring that the planning module itself will never cause an accident.  
2.2 International horizontal regulation of automated vehicles 
France is establishing a legislative framework (French Republic, 2018) to allow testing of autonomous cars on 
public roads and the circulation of autonomous vehicles by 2022 (Autovista Group, 2018). At present, 
driverless vehicles tests on public roads are restricted to precise time and location in order to avoid 
interference with ordinary road users.  
In May 2017 the Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Sea released a working document with preliminary 
framework considerations on an International horizontal regulation of automated vehicles (French Republic, 
2017), aimed at contributing to the discussion ongoing at United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) Working Party 29 (WP29) Intelligent Transport Systems and Automated Driving (ITS/AD) Informal 
Group.  
The document proposes the "horizontal" regulation to be based on a systemic approach (vehicle, 
infrastructure, driving conditions, connection); diversity of “task sharing” between driver and system (from SAE 
level 2 to level 4); use-cases and their operation domain (Delache and Bazzucchi, 2017). 
Sound regulation architecture can be defined starting from the following building concepts: 
1. the identification of vehicles' sub-systems (driver, Human-Machine Interfaces - HMI, automation system, 
driving organs) 
2. automation use-cases, defined by the combination of four main parameters (Operational Design Domain 
- ODD, elementary functions, triggering conditions, driving task sharing) 
3. Regulation domains, decomposed based on previously defined concepts and functions and independently 
from technologies or systems 
The regulation philosophy is based on use-cases description, including their precise and applicable set of use-
conditions (different use-conditions imply different use-cases) and driver attitude/commitment.  
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The regulation might include specific requirements on HMI main functionalities and message priority 
management, in order to ensure their efficiency in addressing safety. 
Critical situations/events beyond normal use conditions have to be identified for which the automated 
vehicle’s behaviour is expected to be specific. A multi-layer approach is proposed, which sets different 
requirements depending on the involved level of criticality (levels ranging from 1 to 5). According to such 
principle, different minimal risk manoeuvers (MRM) performance levels would be defined. Moreover, 
connectivity related issues could be taken into account in the analysis of critical situations/events as they 
represent an additional contribution to the vehicle’s sensing capabilities. 
The resulting regulation’s architecture (Figure 1) includes a horizontal layer plus vertical regulations. The 
horizontal layer builds on use-case description, use-case analysis and use-case requirements. 
Figure 1. Proposed schematic architecture. 
 
Source: French Republic, 2017. 
The document also includes considerations on possible validation approaches and tools to match the different 
“regulation building blocks” proposed. First considerations are made on level of verification (Self-declared, 
Evidence-based, Certified by third party, Tested by public authority) and validation tools (Documentation 
screening or analysis, Simulations, Tests) according to the type of requirements and level of criticality (Table 
1).  
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Table 1. Possible validation procedures and tools 
 
Source: French Republic, 2017. 
2.3 PEGASUS Method for Assessment of Highly Automated Driving Function 
(HAD-F) 
The project for the establishment of generally accepted quality criteria, tools and methods as well as 
scenarios and situations for the release of highly-automated driving functions (PEGASUS) is promoted by the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). Its objective is to develop and demonstrate 
methods, criteria, tools and guidelines to safeguard highly automated driving functions (Level 3), in order to 
facilitate the rapid implementation of automated driving into practice (PEGASUS, 2019). 
The project was launched in 2016 with the aim of developing, until 2019, a standardised procedure for the 
testing and approval of automated driving functions and gathers together automotive companies, suppliers, 
small and medium-sized companies as well as research facilities. The main goals also include the 
development of a continuous and flexible tool chain to safeguard the automated driving; the integration of 
the tests in the development processes; the definition of a cross-manufacturer method for the safeguarding 
of highly automated driving functions. 
Within the project PEGASUS, a scenario-based approach is considered to reduce the approval effort for highly 
automated driving. The basic assumption is that critical scenarios are quite rare and randomly distributed in 
real traffic, while no critical events happen during most of highway driven range. Moreover, since testing of 
the ordinary scenarios does not bring relevant contribution to the approval process, the identification of 
critical scenarios to be tested would significantly reduce the long driving test distances needed for a 
statistical approval (Amersbach and Winner, 2017). 
PEGASUS general methodology is sketched in Figure 2 (read counter-clockwise from the bottom left "Use 
Case, Knowledge, Data" to the upper left "Safety Argumentation"). The right hand side describes procedural 
aspects, how the evidence for the safety argumentation is generated. The process flow consists of four basic 
elements: A. Definition of requirements, B. Data Processing, C. Information storage and processing in a 
database, D. Evaluation of the highly automated driving function. 
Based on current knowledge (1) (legal or standardisation documents), safety requirements (3) are analysed 
and identified for highly automated vehicles. PEGASUS Project develops such fundamental safety 
requirements as a recommendation only. Within a second step, the knowledge (1) is also used for systematic 
scenario identification (4) and integrated into the scenario database (9). Current data (2) from different 
sources are converted or reconstructed into a uniform PEGASUS data format (5). This data (7) are assigned to 
logical scenarios in the database (8). The goal of this analytical data-driven concept is to evaluate whether 
the systematic identification covers the real scenarios or if additional scenarios and parameter spaces are 
needed. 
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Figure 2. PEGASUS method. 
 
Source: PEGASUS, 2019. 
The space of logical test cases (12), provided by the database is used by the test concept (13) to vary and to 
generate concrete test cases (14). This includes a determination of concrete scenarios, an assignment of test 
environments (simulation-based approaches, proving ground, real world) as well as a transfer of the existing 
test criteria. The test concept uses the information from the database and the test results within an iterative 
search for challenging cases. The test cases (14) are executed with simulation-based test methods, at the 
proving ground or in real world tests, or combinations thereof. Based on the primary evaluation criteria (3) the 
test results are evaluated (17) and used to determine (19) the risk with a unified approach proposed from (3) 
(Mazzega, 2018). 
Driving task decomposition was also presented within the PEGASUS project for test case generation 
(Amersbach and Winner, 2017), aiming at reducing the approval effort even more. A six-layer decomposition 
of for HAD function is presented to analyse failures that lead to traffic accidents (failure chain): (Layer 0) 
Information access; (Layer 1) Information reception; (Layer 2) Information processing; (Layer 3) Situational 
understanding; (Layer 4) Behavioural decision; (Layer 5) Action. Thanks to the combination of the scenario-
based approach with the functional decomposition of the HAD function to be approved, particular test cases 
can be specified based on a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). As a result, some of the identified test cases can be 
eliminated or aggregated, reducing the needed testing effort. Further to that, the decomposition approach can 
be used to reduce the approval effort for variants or updated functions. 
2.4 Vehicle Safety Security Framework (VSSF) 
The Dutch Vehicle Authority (RDW), proposed a methodology (Pater, 2018) that starts from the assumption 
that the European Type Approval System is not sustainable for testing upcoming generation of vehicles with 
more than 100 million lines of software and connections to the outside world. Therefore, in order to bridge 
the gap between regulation and innovation a new way of testing, certifying and monitoring is needed, which 
will eventually include virtual testing of the car and a driver license for the software. In preparation of the 
new type approval regulation, RDW identified three main fields of action:  
— Learning Audit / Learning Experience - VSSF 
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— Vehicle Driving License – vDL 
— Experimentation Law (January 2019) 
As initial step towards standardising the process of approving vehicles with highly automated systems, RDW 
established the “The Vehicle Safety and Security Framework” (VSSF, Table 2) in order to build the necessary 
expertise through learning experiences. According to the VSSF process (Figure 3), information is gathered 
through learning sessions and then analysed within the learning framework. Requirements are developed 
starting from that, which are then fed into best practices, standards and guidelines. Based on those 
requirements, a new/updated program is developed for product type approval. 
Table 2. RDW Learning Framework. 
 
Source: Pater, 2018. 
Figure 3. VSSF process. 
 
Source: Pater, 2018. 
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Further to that, RDW designated Green Dino to develop a licence for Artificial Intelligence (AI)-drivers. As a 
result, a collaboration of stakeholders was initiated under the ‘Digital Driving License Project’, in order to 
define an international standard for licensing of intelligent vehicle operating systems, human and AI. The 
proposed process of testing includes: virtual environment, scale modelling, proving ground, driving exam, 
driving license and in-use compliance. First pilot driving license in the Netherlands planned within 2019. 
International collaboration for the release of a new ISO standard by 2022 is also proposed. 
2.5 ENABLE-S3 Project - European Initiative to Enable Validation for Highly 
Automated Safe and Secure Systems  
ENABLE-S3 is an industry-driven project and aspires to substitute today’s cost-intensive verification & 
validation efforts by more advanced and efficient methods to pave the way for the commercialisation of 
highly automated cyber physical systems (ACPS). From one side pure simulation alone cannot cover all 
physical details and from the other real-world tests are too expensive, too time consuming and potentially 
dangerous. Thus, ENABLE-S3 aims at developing an innovative solution combining both approaches in an 
optimised manner (ENABLE–S3, 2019).  
ENABLE-S3 is use-case driven, representing relevant environments and scenarios from six industry sectors 
(automotive, aerospace, rail, maritime, health, and farming). Each of the models, methods and tools 
integrated into the validation platform can be applied to at least one use case, under the guidance of the 
Verification and Validation (V&V) methodology, where they are validated and their usability demonstrated. 
The project aims at developing new technologies to ensure correct, reliable and safe (e.g. according to 
regulatory requirements) behaviour of highly automated and autonomous systems (situation understanding, 
decision-making, planning and control). ENABLE-S3 approach focuses on virtualisation using modelling and 
simulation. The main objective is to ensure automated systems reliability and minimising the risk of 
design/implementation faults by the provision of a comprehensive modular verification and validation 
framework covering the validation methodology on the one hand side and the validation platform to conduct 
the tests on the other side (Figure 4).  
Figure 4. ENABLE-S3 validation framework. 
 
Source: ENABLE-S3, 2019. 
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The technical approach covers the following aspects:  
— Extraction of test scenarios (e.g. from vehicle road data)  
— Scenario-based verification & validation in virtual, semi-virtual, and real testing environments  
— Environment and sensor models as well as sensor stimuli for Model/Software in the Loop (MiL/SiL), 
Hardware in the Loop (HiL) and Vehicle in the Loop (ViL) 
— Integrated safety and security analysis approaches  
— Reduction of required tests for highly varying environmental conditions  
— Draft-standards for test scenario descriptions  
For the automotive sector, six use-cases are considered (ENABLE-S3, 2018): 
— Use case 1 – Highway pilot 
— Use case 2 – Intersection crossing using autonomous vehicles 
— Use case 3 – Use case context-aware in-car reasoning system 
— Use case 4 – Traffic jam pilot with Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communication 
— Use case 5 – Traffic jam chauffeur with in-vehicle sensors  
— Use case 6 – Use case valet parking 
For each use-case, a set of "demonstrators" are identified as methodologies and tools necessary in order to 
assess the vehicle safety performance. As an example, AVL DrivingCube (test bed extended by physical sensor 
stimulators) is proposed as demonstrator to integrate the different tools and methods, related to the Highway 
Pilot testing functions that have been developed during the project.  
2.6 Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) approach 
University of Stuttgart and Continental presented an approach based on Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) to be applied in compliance with ISO 26262 for developing a safe architecture for fully automated 
vehicles (Abdulkhaleq et al. 2017a, 2017b). STPA was developed as an holistic approach alternative to Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), which are currently used in the most recent 
ISO 26262 applications to identify component failures, errors and faults that lead to specific hazards (in the 
presence of faults). Indeed those methods are not suitable for addressing new hazards caused by complex 
human-automated system interactions (dysfunctional component interactions, software failure, and human 
error), while STPA can address more types of hazards and treats safety as a dynamic control problem rather 
than an individual component failure. The methodology aims at applying STPA to extend the safety scope of 
ISO 26262 and support the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments (HARA) process.  
In fact, while the safety scope of the HARA in ISO 26262 is to identify the possible hazards caused by the 
malfunctioning behaviour of electronic and electrical systems (individual components), STPA also focuses on 
identifying the potential inadequate controls (caused by human error, interaction failure, environmental, 
software failure) that could lead to the hazards (Figure 5), also in the absence of component failure. 
Figure 5. Safety scope of STPA and HARA in ISO 26262. 
 
Source: Abdulkhaleq and Lammering, 2017. 
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The main starting point of STPA is to identify potential accidents and hazards at the system level and draw 
hierarchical safety control structure of the system (Step 0). Then such results are used to define an item and 
item information needed (e.g. purpose, content of item, functional requirements etc.). The list of hazards, 
accident, the high-level system safety constraints identified in Step 0 is also used as an input to the HARA 
approach. 
Step 1 identifies the unsafe control actions of an item while Step 2 identifies the causal factors and unsafe 
scenarios deriving from each of them. Finally, results of STPA Step 1 & 2 are used to develop the system 
functional safety concept and safety requirements at this level. 
An example of application of the proposed concept to a current project of a fully automated vehicle at 
Continental was presented. As a result, 24 system level accidents, 176 hazards, 27 unsafe control actions, 
and 129 unsafe scenarios were identified. 
STPA approach can potentially be used to: (i) support the safety lifecycle and HARA process in ISO 26262; (ii) 
identify the operational safety requirements and develop operational safety concepts of fully automated 
driving vehicle; (iii) evaluate and develop a reliable architecture for fully automated driving vehicle.  
2.7 TÜV Rheinland  
TÜV Rheinland carried out a number of vehicle safety assessments for the German government in the 
framework of EU exemption procedures for driver assistant systems (SAE level 2 systems) on the basis of 
current legal framework. TÜV Rheinland has experience in assessing vehicle safety in the absence of 
harmonised rules, requiring the relevant information by manufacturers, carrying out the risk assessment and 
requiring the tailored tests. TÜV has therefore ideas on how to improve the current EU exemption framework 
for new technologies. 
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3 Conclusions 
Various approaches regarding the safety assessment of AVs are being considered within the EU and 
worldwide by governments, industry and other stakeholders. The aim of the study was to prepare the 
discussion on the state of play at the 1st Technical Workshop on New Approaches for Automated Vehicle 
Certification, addressing different merits/limits of the different methodologies and the way forward.  
In this context, the most important result of the present study was understanding the complementarity of the 
proposed approaches, both in terms of readiness and perspective. This finding was also confirmed by the 
subsequent workshop discussion. The increasing complexity of AV systems requires deeper understanding of 
safety-critical aspects and further research on innovative safety assessment methods. Moreover, all 
participants also acknowledged the importance of this workshop as the first step towards the direction of a 
common European AV safety assessment approach and confirmed their availability to take part in follow-up 
discussions.  
The next step of this process will include the extension of the discussions to other Member States and 
stakeholders and the elaboration of a potential harmonised approach by the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre. 
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